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appear that clear-cut violations of section 7 by means of conglomerate merger might be more readily challenged than those
situations which appear doubtful under the existing standards.

M
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - WARRANTLESS ARREST AND SEARCH
ON THE BASIS OF INFORMER'S COMMUNICATION - PROSECUTION'S
PRE-TRIAL INVOCATION OF "INFORMER'S PRIVILEGE" HELD NOT
CONSTITUTIONALLY OBJECTIONABLE PER SE. - Acting on informa-

tion from a confidential informer that petitioner possessed narcotics,
two Illinois policemen arrested petitioner without a warrant, and
during a search of his person discovered a package of heroin.
Petitioner's motion to suppress the evidence of the heroin was
denied, and he was convicted of unlawful possession of narcotics.
On appeal, he contended that the hearing on his motion to suppress,
where probable cause for arrest was in issue, was constitutionally
defective since the judge had refused to compel identification of
the informer on whose "tip-off" petitioner was arrested. Rejecting
petitioner's claim, the United States Supreme Court held that in
a state pre-trial proceeding where the only issue is probable cause
for arrest, or search, police officers need not be required to disclose
the identity of an informer if the trial judge is convinced, by
evidence submitted in open court and subject to cross-examination,
that the officers did rely in good faith upon credible information
supplied by a reliable informant. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S.

300 (1967).
The informer has long been a familiar figure in the AngloAmerican legal system." So valuable is his role in law enforcement
that the courts have developed the "informer's privilege" 2 allowing

' See Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons,
and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951). The author comments
briefly on the early English practice of approvement. The approver, a party
arraigned on a charge of treason or felony, would confess his guilt, and,
in order to obtain a pardon, would offer to appeal and convict other criminals (appellees). The approver would be pardoned if the appellees were
found guilty, but was hanged if the appellees were acquitted.
2 Originating in the English courts, the "informer's privilege" was first
used to conceal the names of those who disclosed revenue frauds. Rex v.
Akers, 170 Eng. Rep. 850 (1790). See Note, An Informer's Tale:
Its Use in Judicial and Administrative Proceedings, 63 YALE LJ. 206, 209
n.26 (1953).
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the government to conceal the source of its information. 3 Professor
Wigmore provides a modem restatement of the informer's privilege:
A genuine privilege, on . . . fundamental principle . . . must be
recognized for the identity of persons supplying the government With
information concerning the commission of crintes. Communications of

this kind ought to receive encouragement.
the informer's identity is disclosed. 4

They are discouraged if

However, the government's interest in keeping the identity of the
informer a secret must be balanced against the right of an individual
to due process in a criminal proceeding.5
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
prohibits unreasonable search and seizure and provides that no
warrant shall issue without probable cause. 6 In 1961, the Supreme
Court of the United States, in Mapp v. Ohio,7 held that in order
to reinforce the fourth amendment's prohibitions as applicable to
the states,8 all evidence obtained as the result of an unreasonable 9
search and seizure was inadmissible in a state criminal proceeding.' 0
3At times, the privilege has also been extended to the contents of an
informer's communication. The Supreme Court of the United States has

long recognized the privilege. It is said to be based "upon general grounds
of public policy, because of the confidential nature of such communications."
Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311, 316 (1884) (contents of the communication
to the state's attorney, as well as the identity of the informer, were
privileged in an action on the case to recover damages for slander). See
also Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) (federal officer following
a "tip" is not required to reveal the identity of his informant if it is not
essential to the defense). Cf. In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895) (it is
the right of a United States citizen to inform of a violation of the internal
revenue laws of the United States and any conspiracy to interfere with this
right is punishable).
48 J. WIGMORE, EviDEcE §2374(f)
(McNaughton ed. 1961) (footnotes
omitted). See also Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 257 (1961).
5 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) ; Wilson v. United
States, 59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932).
6 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7232 U.S. 383 (1914).
sWolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
9 See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), where the Court stated
that Mapp had not precluded the states from establishing workable rules
governing search and seizure, but made it clear that they would have to
satisfy the "'fundamental criteria' laid down by the Fourth Amendment . . ." Id. at 33.
'oThe exclusionary rule had already been established for the federal
courts in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), but subsequently
had been held not applicable to the states in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25 (1949).
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Although it is clear that the fourth amendment's prohibition
of unreasonable searches and seizures applies to seizure of persons,
i.e., an arrest, as well as to seizure of property," it is equally clear
that the common-law right of a peace officer to arrest and search
without a warrant was not eliminated by its adoption.1 2 It is a
constitutional requirement, however, that the arresting officer act
only on probable cause. Probable cause for arrest and search has
been said to exist where the facts and circumstances within the
arresting officer's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably
trustworthy information, are sufficient to cause a man of reasonable
caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.' 3
Where a search or arrest warrant has been obtained, the
early dictum in Grau v. United States' 4 that only evidence competent in a jury trial may be utilized to show probable cause
existed, has been superseded by later case law. 15 In a criminal
trial guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but probable
cause requires only a showing of probabilities.'0 In Jones v. United
States,17 the Court followed the previously established rule that
hearsay may constitute probable cause for the issuance of a warrant.
In Jones, the search warrant was based solely on an affidavit by
a federal narcotics officer reciting that: (1) an unnamed informer
had told the affiant that the petitioner was engaged in illegal
narcotics traffic, and had sold narcotics to the informer; (2) previously received information from this informer had been correct;
(3) the same information had been received from other sources;
(4) petitioner and associate were known drug addicts; and,
(5) the affiant believed illicit drugs to be secreted in petitioner's
apartment. The Court held this was sufficient evidence of probable
cause to issue a search warrant, stating that issuance of the
warrant was proper "so long as there was a substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay.""'
Draper v. United States' 9 established that an arrest without
a warrant may be based on a communication from an informer
to an arresting officer so long as there is a substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay. There, a federal narcotics agent was told by
an informer, whose information had been reliable and accurate in
the past, that the petitioner, whom the agent did not know, was
"Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-02 (1959); Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 164 (1949).
12 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
131d. at 162; Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).
24287 U.S. 124 (1932).
' 5 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
'16Ibid.

'7362 U.S. 257 (1960).
28 Id.at 272.
19358 U.S. 307 (1959).
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peddling narcotics. The narcotics agent was told that the petitioner
had gone to Chicago to obtain a supply and would return by train
on a specified day. Acting on the informer's information, the
agent met petitioner's train and arrested him without a warrant.
In searching him, the agent seized narcotics and a hypodermic
syringe. On review of petitioner's conviction for violating the
federal narcotics law, the Supreme Court held that the arrest,
search and seizure were lawful and the evidence seized was
admissible at petitioner's trial.
Subsequent to Draper and Jones, the Supreme Court clarified
the requirements for probable cause when a warrant is sought on
the basis of an informer's communication 20 and when an arrest
is made without a warrant. 2 1 In Aguilar v. Texas, the affidavit
stated: "Affiants have received reliable information from a credible
person and do believe that heroin . . . and narcotic paraphernalia
are being kept at the above described premises for the purpose
of sale and use contrary to the provisions of the law."

22

The Court

held that the affidavit did not show probable cause since it failed
to show whether the informer had any personal knowledge of the
facts he related. It merely stated that the affiants believed the
defendant to have narcotics. It stated no facts supporting the
belief, nor any information actually received from the informer.
Aguilar sets forth the rule that where sufficient corroboration is
absent, underlying circumstances of both the informer's conclusion
of guilt and the conclusion of the officer that the 23informer is
reliable must be put before the reviewing magistrate.
In Beck v. Ohio,24 police officers received unspecified "information" and "reports" about the petitioner. The police, aware of
petitioner's prior gambling record, stopped his automobile and
placed him under arrest. Although they had no arrest or search
warrant they nevertheless searched petitioner's car, but found
nothing. Taking petitioner to the police station, they found some
clearing house slips on his person. The Court reversed petitioner's
conviction for possession of the slips, holding the arrest and search
invalid in that no probable cause had been shown.
20

Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).

2 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). See also Comment, Informer's
Word as the Basis for Probable Cause in the Federal Courts, 53 CALW. L.
Rv. 840 (1965).
22378 U.S. 108, 109 (1964).
23 Id. at 114. See also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965),

following Aguilar. An affidavit for a search warrant may be based on
hearsay information as long as the magistrate is informed of some of the
underlying circumstances supporting the afiant's conclusions and his belief
that any informant involved, whose identity need not be disclosed, was
credible or his information reliable. Id. at 108.
24379 U.S. 89 (1964).
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When probable cause is lacking, all evidence seized during an
arrest or search is vulnerable to a motion to suppress.2 5 Thus, it
becomes important for the defendant to attack the informer's
information as insufficient to establish probable cause. However,
defendant's attempt to attack the informer's credibility is thwarted
by the informer's privilege. The Supreme Court has twice directly
confronted the informer's privilege. In Roviaro v. United States,20
the petitioner was convicted of knowingly possessing and transporting heroin unlawfully imported. Two federal narcotics agents were
notified by an informer that he was to purchase narcotics from
the defendant. One of the agents secreted himself in the informant's car while the other followed closely in a separate car. Defendant entered the informant's car and ordered him to drive
to a designated place. After a conversation in the car (overheard
by the agent), the defendant ordered the informer to stop the car.
Defendant then got out, went to a tree near the road, picked up a
package, and threw it into the informant's car, after which he
entered another car and drove away. This was observed by the
second agent, and upon discovering narcotics in the package, both
agents proceeded to defendant's home and arrested him. Defendant
was then brought to trial on a two-count federal indictment charging sale and transportation of narcotics. Pursuant to federal procedure, defendant moved for a bill of particulars before trial and
requested the identity of the informant. The trial court refused
to require disclosure in view of the government's claimed privilege.
The Supreme Court held that since the informer had taken a
material part in bringing about the defendant's possession of the
drugs, had been present with the defendant at the occurrence of the
alleged crime, and might have been a material witness as to
whether defendant knowingly transported the drugs, disclosure was
required.
We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable.
The problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare
his defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous
must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into
consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible
significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors.27
Roviaro is a unique case. Not only was the informant an
actual participant in the alleged crime but, besides the government
agent, he was the only eye-witness.
Furthermore, the issue
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
353 U.S. 53 (1957).
27 Id. at 62.
25
26

See also FED. R. C-m!. P. 41(e).
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was guilt or innocence at trial, not merely probable cause at a
pre-trial hearing. Without the informer's testimony, defendant
could not refute the agent's testimony or prove his innocence.
Therefore, the informant's personal testimony was essential to a
fair trial.
The leading federal case on the issue of disclosure where a
valid warrant has been issued is Rugendorf v. United States.3
Three informers, not material witnesses, gave information constituting probable cause for issuance of a search warrant to agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. An FBI agent obtained a warrant
but did not disclose the names of the informers. The trial court
refused to compel disclosure of the informers' identities, and the
Supreme Court upheld the conviction. The Court ruled that despite
factual errors in the affidavit, the United States Commissioner who
issued the warrant had a substantial basis for crediting the facts
in the affidavit and the petitioner had failed to develop the
criteria of Roviaro necessitating disclosure.
On the other hand, the issue of disclosure at a pre-trial hearing
when the arrest is made without a warrant had not been decided
by the Supreme Court prior to the instant case.2 9 The lower
federal courts were in conflict, some applying the same rule of
nondisclosure in both warrant and nonwarrant cases while others
have distinguished the two.3 '
In the instant case, Mr. Justice Stewart addressed himself to
the issue of probable cause at the outset by distinguishing Beck v.
Ohio. Here, unlike Beck, each of the officers described with
specificity both what the informer actually said and why they
thought the information was credible. The testimony of each
of the officers informed the court of the underlying circumstances
from which the informer concluded that the narcotics were where
he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances
from which the officers concluded that the informant was credible
or his information reliable. The Aguilar test was thus met.
Applying the Brinegar definition of probable cause, the Court
found that the Illinois court was fully justified in holding that at
the time the officers made the arrest, "the facts and circumstances
within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an
offense." 3' Petitioner conceded that the officer's sworn testimony
fully supported a finding of probable cause. However, it was con28376 U.S. 528 (1964).
29

Comment, Informer's Word as the Basis for Probable Cause in the

Federal Courts, supra note 21, at 852.
3oMcCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-12 n.11 (1967).
31 Id. at 304.
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tended that the state court nonetheless violated the constitution in
sustaining objections to petitioner's questions as to the informant's
identity and petitioner sought to challenge the informer's privilege
itself as unconstitutional under the fourth, sixth 3 2 and fourteenth
amendments.
The Court rejected petitioner's constitutional challenges finding nothing violative of due process in the settled state law.
Under Illinois law, where the issue is the preliminary one of probable cause for arrest or search, rather than guilt or innocence,
police officers are not invariably required to disclose an informer's
identity if the trial judge is convinced by evidence submitted in
open court and subject to cross examination that the officers relied
in good faith upon credible information supplied by a reliable informer.32 While citing with approval cases from the highest courts
32

Petitioner's sixth amendment claim was summarily dismissed at the
end of the majority opinion and was not discussed by the dissenting justices
who apparently saw only the fourth amendment issue as substantial. Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), marked the incorporation of the sixth amendment into the fourteenth, thus making the right of an accused to confront
the witnesses against him in any criminal proceeding applicable to the states.
However, the right of confrontation has not been applied in the context of
the informer's privilege and even the lower federal courts which have
required disclosure of the informer's identity in the non-warrant cases have
relied on the fourth amendment and dicta in Roz'iaro v. United States,
353 U.S. 53 (1957), rather than on the sixth amendment. See United
States v. Robinson, 325 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1963); Cochran v. United States,
291 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1961). Relying on its recent decision in Cooper
v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), the Court stated that if the petitioner's
claim was that his sixth amendment rights were violated by the failure of
the state to produce the informer to testify against him, it was "'absolutely
devoid of merit.'" McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 313-14 (1967). If
on the other hand, his claim was that he had been deprived of his right to
cross-examine the arresting officers themselves, since their refusal to reveal
the informer's identity had been upheld, the Court stated that to accept
such a construction of the sixth amendment would mean that "no witness
on cross-examination could ever constitutionally assert a testimonial privilege,
including the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by
the Constitution itself." Id. at 314.
33 Illinois law is contained in the following series of cases: People v.
Connie, 34 Ill. 2d 353, 215 N.E.2d 280 (1966) (unlawful possession of
hypodermic needles and syringe, held failure to require disclosure did not
deny the defendants their constitutional right to due process or their
right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in their favor);
People v. Durr, 28 Ill.
308, 192 N.E2d 379 (1963) (unlawful possession
of narcotics; disclosure not required). Cf. People v. Pitts, 26 IIl. 2d 395,
186 N.E.2d 357 (1962) (unlawful possession of narcotics; a volunteered
statement by a person unknown to the police did not constitute reasonable
grounds for arrest of the defendant without a warrant). People v.
Parren, 24 Ill.
2d 572, 182 N.E.2d 662 (1962) (narcotic prosecution;
under the circumstances the search without a warrant was unreasonable
where officers acted on an anonymous tip).
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of several states which follow a rule similar to that of Illinois, the
Court emphasized that there must always be a balancing between
the public interest in protecting the flow of information and the
individual's right to prepare his own defense. Mr. Justice Stewart
stated: "What Illinois and her sister states have done is no more
than recognize a well established testimonial privilege, long familiar
to the law of evidence." 34
Great weight was placed on the Court's reluctance to compel
disclosure in Roviaro in spite of the fact that the issue in that case
was guilt or innocence at trial and not just probable cause at a
pre-trial hearing on a motion to suppress.
What Roviaro . . . makes clear is that this Court was unwilling to

impose any absolute rule requiring disclosure of an informer's identity
even in formulating evidentiary rules for federal criminal trials.
Much less has the Court ever approached the formulation of a federal
evidentiary rule of compulsory disclosure where the issue is the
preliminary
one of probable cause, and guilt or innocence is not at
5
stake. 3
Here, the arresting officers testified in open court, fully and in
precise detail, as to what information they had received from the
informer and why they had reason to believe the information was
trustworthy. Each officer was under oath and subjected to crosse-xamination. This obviously satisfied the judge that each was
telling the truth.
Mr. Justice Stewart further reasoned that to require a state
court judge at a preliminary hearing to require disclosure in every
case would be to assume that the arresting officers were committing
perjury. He concluded that the fourteenth amendment did not
require such an assumption and that to make such an assumption
would be an unjustified encroachment by the Court upon the constitutional power of the states to promulgate their own rules of
evidence.
In a strong dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas took the
position that the majority had effectively made the police the sole
arbiters of probable cause: "There is no way to determine the
reliability of Old Reliable, the informer, unless he is produced, at
the trial and cross-examined. Unless he is produced, the Fourth
Amendment is entrusted to the tender mercies of the police." 3
It was further contended that the majority was encouraging
warrantless arrests and searches while the whole momentum of
criminal law administration should be in the opposite direction.
3 386 U.S. at 308.
35 Id. at 311.
3Id. at 316 (dissenting opinion).
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In upholding petitioner's conviction, the Court has approved
the evidentiary rule of non-disclosure followed in many jurisdictions.
Among the states with a rule similar to that of Illinois are California,31 New Jersey 38 and New York.3 9 The Court has sanctioned the prosecution's *use of a valuable tool in criminal law
administration.
The argument of the dissent in McCray emphasizes that disclosure is the best procedural safeguard for determining whether
there was actual probable cause in a non-warrant case.40 Proponents of disclosure have contended that, without independent
verification of probable cause, the defendant must "take the officer's word for it." 41 There is always a danger that the arresting
officer may misrepresent his connection with the informer, his
knowledge of the informer's reliability, or the information allegedly
obtained from the informer. 42 Therefore, it is argued, disclosure
of the informer's identity is the most effective way to determine
his reliability. However, the force of this argument is diminished
when it is taken in the context of McCray, i.e., a pre-trial proceeding, where guilt or innocence is not at stake. Here, the evidence obtained is of no less probative force if illegally seized.
The defendant is trying to suppress the "untarnished truth," and
that he may be allowed to is due not to the quality of the evidence
but rather to the need to deter law enforcement officials from
violating the fourth amendment. It would seem that the fourth
amendment is satisfied if the judge who hears the motion to sup37 CAL. EVIDENCE CoDE § 1042(c).
An earlier California case, Priestly
v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958), requiring disclosure,
effectively eliminated the informer's privilege in California.
Practical
exigencies led to its return.
3 State v. Burnett, 42 NJ. 377, 201 A.2d 39 (1964).
39 People v. Coffey, 12 N.Y.2d 443, 191 N.E.2d 263, 240 N.Y.S.2d 721
(1963) (prosecution for third-degree burglary: "withholding the identity
of the informer did not destroy the reliability of the proof offered as to
probable cause and did not on this record constitute error prejudicial to the
defendant"). Id. at 448, 191 N.E.2d at 264, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 723. Compare
People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86, 204 N.E.2d 188, 255 N.Y.S2d 850 (1965)
(disclosure of the informer's identity is required only in cases where there
is insufficient evidence apart from the arresting officer's testimony as to
the informer's communication to establish probable cause. Where, so far
as record shows, police had no evidence to establish probable cause for
defendant's arrest in absence of information received from allegedly reliable
informer and arresting officer's testimony as to such information was unconfirmed, informer must be identified to defendants).
40 For a discussion of both sides of the disclosure issue see also Comment,
Disclosure of Informer's Identities, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 99, 102-03 (1965-66).
41See United States v. Robinson, 325 F.2d 391, 393 (2d Cir. 1963)
(the defendant was not required to "take the officer's word for it" and
disclosure
was required).
42 See United States v. Pearce, 275 F2,d 318, 322 (7th Cir. 1960).
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press has discretion to order disclosure if he feels it necessary to
determine the credibility of the arresting officer.
The importance to the administration of justice of maintaining
the informer's privilege has often been emphasized, and the state
courts have vigorously defended it. Chief Justice Weintraub of
the New Jersey Supreme Court argues that if the defendant may
require disclosure, he will do so in all cases. Certainly he has
nothing to lose and he may gain the suppression of damaging evidence. As a result:
the State could use the informant's information only as a lead and
could search only if it could gather adequate evidence of probable
cause apart from the informant's data. Perhaps that approach would
sharpen investigatorial techniques, but we doubt that there would be
enough talent and time to cope with crime upon that basis. Rather
we accept the premise that the informer is a vital part of society's
defensive arsenal.
The basic rule protecting his identity rests upon
43
that belief.
The dissenting judge in People v. Durazo 4 noted that in California the great majority of narcotics arrests result from the use
of informers, and that subsequent to California decisions limiting
the informer's privilege, law enforcement in the narcotics area had
become "comparatively ineffective." 45 "Obviously it becomes impossible to solicit the assistance of informers where their identity
is required to be revealed and they are thus exposed to retaliation
on the part of narcotic violators." 46
That there is a real danger of retaliation when the informer's
identity is disclosed is well illustrated by the notorious case of
Arnold Schuster, who was murdered after informing on bankrobber Willie Sutton.47 While violence does not always accompany
disclosure of an informer's identity, retribution often does take
the form of suits for false arrest and malicious prosecution.8
The recent report of the President's Commission on law enforcement provides significant comment on the overwhelming social
importance of preserving the informer's privilege. The report devotes an entire chapter to illustrating the intricate hierarchical
State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 201 A.2d 39, 43-44 (1964).
52 Cal. 2d 354, 340 P.2d 594 (1959).
45 Id. at 358-59, 340 P.2d at 597 (dissenting opinion).
"Since 1952 there
has been a state-wide increase of 68 per cent in arrests based on a fixed
population. The corresponding increase in convictions, however, has been
but 10 per cent." Ibid.
46 52 Cal. 2d at 358-59, 340 P.2d at 597.
43
44

•7 See Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E2d 534,

180 N.Y.S2d 265 (1958).
48See, e.g., Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311 (1884); Stelloh v. Liban,
21 Wis. 2d 119, 124 N.W.2d 101 (1963).
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structure of criminal activities. The basic problem in combating
organized crime, according to the Commission, is procedural rather
than substantive.49 The lack of success in efforts to curb the growth
of organized crime in America was attributed chiefly to the difficulSome citizens believe that there is a
ties of obtaining proof. "
social stigma attached to the role of an "informer," but chiefly
there is fear of retribution.
Law enforcement may be able to develop informants, but organized
crime uses torture and murder to destroy the particular prosecution
at hand and to deter others from cooperating with police agencies.
Informants who do furnish intelligence to the police often wish to
remain anonymous and are unwilling to testify publicly. Other
informants are valuable on a long-range basis and cannot be used
in public trials.5
Therefore, it appears that the informer's privilege is a valuable
and necessary aid to law enforcement.
The Commission illustrates why informers have become the
central tool of police in combating narcotics violations. It points
out that the goal of law enforcement in this area is to reach the
highest possible sources of drug supply. This is quite difficult
because of the fact that drug transactions are always consensual.
"There are no complaining witnesses or victims; there are only
sellers and willing buyers." 52 Since the law enforcement officer
must initiate the case, undercover investigation is essential. "The
use of informants to obtain leads and to arrange introductions is
• standard and essential." 53 According to the Commission,
the informant is typically facing charges himself and agrees to
give information needed for the "big case" in return for a reduction in charges on the condition that his identity remain confidential. This practice is exemplified by the fact that in the narcotics
area, the brunt of enforcement has fallen heavily upon the user
and the addict. 54
The McCray case may be examined in at least two contexts.
In one, it stands as the culmination of recent cases that have
sought to test the informer's privilege either collaterally or directly.
49

R EORT BY

ADmINISTRATION

50 Id. at
51 Ibid.
52 Id.at

198.

THE PRESIDENT'S CojilssioN oiN

LAW ENFORCEMENT

AND

oF JUsTIcE, at 200 (1967).

218.

53
Ibid.
54
In cases handled by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, more than 40%
of the defendants prosecuted are addicts. The emphasis on enforcement

through the addict is due to his constant exposure to surveillance and
arrest and his potential value as an informant. Id. at 219.
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In Hoffa v. United States,55 the defense attacked the use of a
government informer on the general grounds that it violated the
historic notions of fair play of English speaking peoples. The
Court summarily rejected that argument, stating that while secret
government informers are no less free from relevant constitutional
restrictions than are any other government agents, their use is not
per se unconstitutional."6
In Lewis v. United States, 57 the Court reiterated that the
Government was entitled to use decoys and to conceal the identity
of informers. The Court held that the deceptions by the agent
were not unconstitutional. A rule abolishing all deceptions and
requiring compulsory disclosure would "severely hamper the Government" in the enforcement of narcotics laws. s
In the context of these recent cases, and the emphasis on
combating organized crime exemplified by the establishment cf the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice, McCray might indicate a more conservative approach
by the Court in this area of procedural due process.5 9 The President's Commission has suggested legislation that would mbstantially alter the administration of criminal justice. One recommendation calls for a general witness immunity statute eracted at
both federal and state levels providing immunity sufficienily broad
to assure compulsion of testimony 60 Such a measure coul greatly
increase the flow of information provided by the crimiinal. A
second important recommendation is a provision that wculd allow
the prosecution a broad right of appeal from motions to suppress
evidence or confessions. 61 If, indeed, McCray does m~rk a conservative turn by the Court, it may well be willing to sustain
legislation enacted in response to the Commission's reommendations.
55385 U.S. 293 (1966).
rG Id. at 311.
57385

5

U.S. 206 (1966).

d. at 210. See also Osborn v. United States, 385 US. 323 (1966)
(conviction for endeavoring to bribe a member of a jury panel; a tape
recording authorized by a magistrate which related a convesation between
the informer and the defendant was admissible at trial).
59 Compare the Court's earlier willingness to extend proodural constitutional rights beyond the trial level in such cases as Miraida v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1965) and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1963).
See also the reaction to McCray in the news media. "For every Supreme
Court action aimed at guaranteeing the rights of the acctsed, there is a
reaction that the court is hindering the police. .

. .

[In MiCrayl the court

issued a ruling that helped instead of hindered law enorcement." Tm m,
March 31, 1967, at 73. "The ruling . .. will do much to ease the widespread complaints by the police that the decision in 1961 [Mapp v. Ohio]
had 'handcuffed' them." N.Y. Times, March 21, 1967, at 20, col. 3 (city ed.).
6O
SuPra note 49, at 140.
6
l Supra note 49, at 141.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL.. 42

On the other hand, viewed in a larger historical context, McCray might merely be a timely reiteration of settled law. If the
decision is approached from the viewpoint of the ancient informer's privilege, the Court appears to be striking a balance in
favor of the public interest in the free flow of informer's information in an area where, if the accused fails to suppress the "untarnished truth,"6 2 he will not be prejudiced in his right to a fair
trial.
Viewed in this light, the Court is emphasizing that constitutioral rights are not absolutes. Here, as in other areas, interests
must be balanced. 3 The Court has reasoned that the detrimental
effect that a decision requiring disclosure of the informer's identity
in cases of warrantless arrests would have on the administration
of criminal justice cannot be justified merely to grant the accused
the opportunity to challenge the testimony of a witness whose
presere is not necessary to the determination of his guilt or
innocetce.

McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 307 (1967).
6s For examp'e, freedom of speech and press. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360
U.S. 72 (1959) 'on- of the many cases expressing the "balancing" test).
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